




Abstract. We consider lotteries with reimbursements. It turns out that
without loss of generality it is enough analyze lotteries where the winner gets
her expenses reimbursed. We ﬁnd that such a lottery (Sad-Loser) has multiple
pure-strategy equilibria. We describe all equilibria and discuss their properties.
In particular, we ﬁnd (1) a suﬃcient condition for the net total spending to
be higher in the Sad-Loser lottery than in the standard lottery, (2) that the
Exclusion Principle holds.
Keywords: Lottery, Contest, Winner’s reward
JEL Classiﬁcation: D72, L83.
1. Introduction
Lotteries are an important part of our life. They are a big business. Charities raise
money, government gets a big share of its revenue through lotteries. For example,
California total lottery sales in the ﬁscal year 2006/2007 reached astronomical $3,318
millions.1 There is a big literature on lotteries and its applications. Discussions
about State Lotteries in America can be found in Clotfelter and Cook (1989, 1990),
Cook and Clotfelter (1993). Morgan (2000) and Duncan (2002) provide theoretical
contributions. Morgan and Sefton (2000) and Lange, List, and Price (2007) report
experimental results. Craig, Lange, List, Price, and Rupp (2006) present ﬁeld evi-
dence. However, the lottery design (the winner gets the main prize and each player
h a st op a y )i sa l w a y sﬁxed in the current literature. In this paper, we consider lot-
teries with reimbursements where diﬀerent players have diﬀerent values for the main
prize. Once we understand how lotteries with reimbursements work, we can think
about applications.
First, we demonstrate (almost without loss of generality2)t h a tf o ro u ra n a l y s i si t
is enough to consider winner-reimbursed lotteries (which we call Sad-Loser lotteries3).
∗I am grateful to Jack Ochs for helpful comments.




3The name comes from Riley and Samuelson’s (1981) example of Sad-Loser Auction.
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In fact, this type of lotteries is easy to implement: the lottery designer has to announce
the following rules
1. Each player is eligible to submit as his lottery bid any positive real number.
Each bid corresponds to the same number of lottery tickets.
2. The lottery winner receives the prize and retains his bid.
3. All other players lose their bids.
Second, we analyze the Sad-Loser lottery where diﬀerent players have diﬀerent
values for the main prize in detail. It turns out that there are multiple equilibria in
pure strategies.4 We found all such equilibria. The equilibria can be of two types:
i-type and internal type. i-type equilibria are such that only player i spends a positive
amount and all other players spend nothing. The net total spending is zero in any
i-type equilibrium.
Internal equilibria are such that at least two players are active (spend positive
amounts).5 We demonstrate that the players’ expected payoﬀs are zero in any internal
equilibrium. Moreover, we discover a suﬃcient condition for the expected designer
proﬁt (the net total spending) in the Sad-Loser lottery to be higher than the total
spending in the standard lottery. This condition is simple and natural: if all players
are active in the standard lottery, then the expected proﬁti nany internal equilibrium
in the Sad-Loser lottery is higher than the total spending (designer proﬁt) in the
standard lottery. This result can be important for diﬀerent applications of the Sad-
Loser lottery.
In order to understand better how the Sad-Loser lottery works it is important
to compare it with the standard lottery where players have diﬀerent prize values.
Hillman and Riley (1989) show that the standard lottery has a set of active high-value
players in the unique equilibrium.6 Stein (2002) describes the equilibrium spending of
the active players. As it is usual in the contest literature, higher-value player spends
more in the equilibrium in the standard lottery. It turns out that the equilibrium
behavior is drastically diﬀerent in the Sad-Loser lottery. We demonstrate a counter
intuitive result that a higher-value (stronger) player always spends less than a lower-
value (weaker) player and therefore always has a lower chance to win the Sad-Loser
4It is a standard result in the contest literature that a contest has a unique equilibrium in pure
strategies, see for example Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997).
5Some Sad-Loser lotteries can have an internal equilibrium where all players are active.
6Fang (2002) and Matros (2006) prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium.Sad-Loser Lottery 3
lottery in any internal equilibrium.7
Another striking observation is that the Exclusion Principle holds for the (net)
total spending in the Sad-Loser lottery. This result is surprising because the opposite
claim is true for the standard lottery, see Fang (2002).
1.1. Contest literature. Contest literature has greatly expanded since Tullock








Vi − xi,i =1 ,...,n, (1)
where n ≥ 2p l a y e r se x e r te ﬀort in order to win one prize, r>0. Player i exerts eﬀort




j to win prize Vi,i fxi > 0. Tullock’s initial problem was
presented for the same prize values: V1 = ... = Vn. Hillman and Riley (1989) analyze
the standard lottery, r =1 ,w i t hd i ﬀerent prize values V1 ≥ ... ≥ Vn > 0. Nti (1999)
describes the unique Nash equilibrium in the two-player case for any 0 <r<2a n d
diﬀerent prize values.
There are two main questions in the contest literature.8 The ﬁrst one is How to
reduce rent-seeking activities? This question was originally raised in Tullock (1967,
1980), Kruger (1974), and Posner (1975). The second question is How to maximize
the total eﬀort in contests? Recently, this question attracted a lot of attention. See,
for example, Gradstein and Konrad (1999); Moldovanu and Sela (2001) among others.
It turns out that the Sad-Loser lottery can surprisingly help to answer both questions.
It is possible because of the multiplicity of equilibria. As we mentioned above, the
rent-seeking activities are zero (minimized) in any i-type equilibrium. Note that i-
type equilibrium is easy to implement: the designer has to allow player i to move
ﬁrst. At the same time, since we provide the ranking of diﬀerent internal equilibria
in the Sad-Loser lottery, we are are able to ﬁnd the equilibrium where the net total
spending is maximized: only top two players have to be active in this equilibrium.
Recently, a new area of research has sprung investigating the situation where the
contest winner is reimbursed for her expenses. This type of contest has applications
in politics, see Matros and Armanios (2007), R&D and industrial organization, see
Kaplan, Luski, Sela, and Wettstein (2002).
7In the recent paper Cohen and Sela (2005) consider the Sad-Loser lottery. They show that in
the two-player case there exists a unique internal equilibrium where the weak contestant wins with
higher probability than the stronger one. We demonstrate that this property holds in all internal
equilibria for any number of players n ≥ 2.
8See Nitzan (1994) and Konrad (2007) for the overview.Sad-Loser Lottery 4
Matros and Armanios (2007) analyze contests with reimbursements, 0 <r≤ 1,
but all prize values are the same V1 = ... = Vn (this approach is similar to Tullock’s
contest’s approach). In this paper, we consider n-player Sad-Loser lotteries, r =1 ,
but analyze diﬀerent prize values (this approach is similar to Hillman and Riley’s
contest’s approach). Cohen and Sela (2005)c o n s i d e r2 - p l a y e rS a d - L o s e rl o t t e r i e s ,
describe the unique internal equilibrium, and discuss its properties.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present lotteries
with reimbursements and the Sad-Loser lottery. Properties of internal equilibria are
studied in Section 4. Section 5 makes a comparison between the Sad-Loser lottery
and the standard lottery. Concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2. The Model
Consider a lottery with reimbursements among n ≥ 2 risk-neutral players. Players
buy simultaneously lottery tickets in order to win one prize. Player i’s valuation for
the prize is Vi. Suppose that
V1 ≥ V2 ≥ ... ≥ Vn > 0. (2)
The players’ valuations are commonly known among the players and we assume that
the winner/loser reimbursements are additively separable in the winner and loser

















L (zi) − zi, (3)
where the ﬁrst term in (3) is the probability to win the lottery,
zi Pn
j=1 zj ≥ 0, times
the lottery prize for player i, Vi, and the winner’s reimbursement, πW (zi); the second






≥ 0, times the loser’s reim-
bursement, πL (zi); and the last term is the cost.9 In order to ﬁnd the closed-form
solution we look at linear reimbursement functions.10 We assume that the individual
reimbursement depends only on the individual eﬀort
π
W (z)=αz, π
L (z)=βz,( 4 )








9We assume that if z1 = ... = zn = 0, then nobody wins the prize.
10Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (2005) also examine linear reimbursements.Sad-Loser Lottery 5
where






It means that dealing with parameter β introduces an unnecessary degree of freedom
to our analysis. What really matters is the extent of reimbursement to a winner given
the net spending of a loser; this is entirely captured by the parameter γ and so it is
clear that it is (almost) without loss of generality to set β =0 . 11 We are interested
to analyze how winner’s reimbursement aﬀects equilibrium behavior in lotteries. In
order to emphasize that, we will look at the sad-loser lottery, α =1o rγ =1 ,i nt h e
rest of the paper.
3. Sad-Loser Lottery
Consider a Sad-Loser lottery (5) with γ = 1 among n ≥ 2 risk-neutral players. The









− 1=0 . (6)














xi =0 ,i f
X
j6=i
xj ≥ Vi,( 7 )
xi > 0, if 0 ≤
X
j6=i
xj ≤ Vi. (8)
We will call player i active if xi > 0. The entry condition (8) and the non-entry con-
dition (7) must hold for active and non-active players respectively in the equilibrium.
We will be looking for equilibria in pure strategies. Since each active player has to
11It is almost (but not completely) without loss of generality to set β = 0. The exception is β =1
(winner-pay lottery), γ =
α−β
1−β is ill-deﬁned. We leave this case outside of the paper.Sad-Loser Lottery 6









xj ≤ Vi. (9)
Note that the second order condition (8) and the non-negative payoﬀ condition (9)
coincide for the active players.
















i +[ Vi − 2s(n)]xi + s(n)(s(n) − Vi)=0 .
Therefore,




There are two solutions of the equation (10). They are
xi1 = s(n)( 1 1 )
and
xi2 = s(n) − Vi. (12)
First, consider solution (11). This solution and the entry condition (8) describe all
i-type equilibria.




V2, if i =1 . (13)Sad-Loser Lottery 7
Proof. Consider (0,...,0,x i,0,...,0), where xi satisﬁes (13). It is straightforward
to check that condition (8) holds for the active player. All other players are not active
because the non-entry condition (7) holds:
X
j6=k
xj = xi >V k for any k 6= i.
The ﬁrst order condition (6) holds by our choice of xi.T h e r e f o r e ,( 0 ,...,0,x i,0,...,0)
is indeed an equilibrium. ¥
i-type equilibria in our model are similar to i-type equilibria in the second-price
seal-bid auctions where just one bidder - bidder i - places a (very) high bid and all
other bidders bid zero. It is highly unlikely that i-type equilibria can actually arise in
applications where all players have to make their decisions simultaneously. However,
the lottery designer can take advantage of these equilibria if his goal is to reduce
the net total spending or rent-seeking activities. The designer should allow one (his
favorite) player i to buy lottery tickets ﬁrst, then allow all other players to buy. If
the selected player i buys “enough” tickets (consistent with an i-type equilibrium),
then all other players will have a negative expected payoﬀ for any positive amount of
expenses. Therefore, all other players buy nothing and player i is reimbursed. Hence,
t h et o t a ln e ts p e n d i n go rr e n td i s s i pation in this equilibrium is zero.
Second, consider solution (12). There must be at least two active players in this
type of equilibria. It follows from (12) that
X
j6=i
xj = Vi, (14)
















From (14) and (15), we get





Vi − Vi. (16)
Expression (16) together with the entry condition (8) describe all internal equilibria.Sad-Loser Lottery 8
Proposition 2. In an internal equilibrium (x1,...,xn) with k active players, each
active player i buys lottery tickets according to formula (16).
Propositions 1 and 2 characterize all equilibria in the Sad-Loser lottery.
3.1. Players’ expected payoﬀs. We calculate players’ expected equilibrium
payoﬀs in this subsection. Note that the expected equilibrium payoﬀ of any non-
active player is always zero. We start from i-type equilibria.
Proposition 3. The expected payoﬀ o ft h ea c t i v ep l a y e ri in the equilibrium of i-
type is Vi.
Proof. It follows from (13) and (5). ¥
The only active player gets the prize and her expenses are reimbursed. As the
result, the net total spending equals to zero. We consider internal equilibria now.
Proposition 4. The expected payoﬀ of each player in any internal equilibrium is
zero.
Proof. Consider any internal equilibrium with k active players. Suppose that
player i is active in this equilibrium. Then condition (16) must hold for player i.




− xi = s(k)
xi
s(k)
− xi =0 .
¥
Proposition 4 gives an intuition for why the Sad-Loser lottery can generate higher
expected revenue than the usual lottery: the players expect to receive nothing, hence,
the designer should obtain all available expected proﬁt. This result is in contrast with
the standard observation in the contest literature: the expected individual payoﬀsa r e
usually positive. See for example, Tullock (1980); Nitzan (1994); Congleton, Hillman,
and Konrad (2007); Konrad (2007).
We consider the internal equilibria in the next section.
4. Internal Equilibria
First, we ﬁnd the number of internal equilibria. Second, the total equilibrium spend-
ing is described. Then, we show that a higher-value (stronger) player always exerts
less eﬀort than a lower-value (weaker) player and therefore has a lower chance to win
the Sad-Loser lottery in any internal equilibrium. Finally, the expected total spend-
ing is analyzed. In this section, we also show that the Exclusion Principle holds for
the (net) total spending in the Sad-Loser lottery.Sad-Loser Lottery 9
4.1. Number of Internal Equilibria. In turns out that if players’ prize values
are relatively close, there can be as many as 2n − (n + 1) internal equilibria in pure
strategies. The following proposition states it formally.




Then, there are 2n−(n +1 )internal equilibria in pure strategies. In particular, there
are n!
(n−k)!k! internal equilibria with 2 ≤ k ≤ n active players.
Proof. Note that there are exactly n!
(n−k)!k! possibilities to have k active players
in the Sad-Loser lottery. Active player equilibrium spending is uniquely determined




(n−k)!k! =2 n−(n +1 )i n t e r n a l
equilibria. The entry condition (8) and the non-entry condition (7) must hold for k
active and for all other players respectively in an internal equilibrium with k active
players. Consider condition (7): player i is non-active (xi =0 ) ,i f
X
j6=i
xj = s(k) ≥ Vi.





Vi = V1. (18)
Condition (17) ensures that there are 2n−(n + 1) internal equilibria in pure strategies.
¥
If player 1’s lottery prize value is much higher than lottery prize values of other
players, there are only (n − 1) internal equilibria with two active players. Player 1 is
active in all of them.




Then, there are (n − 1) internal equilibria in pure strategies:
⎛




⎠ for l =2 ,...,n. (20)
In each internal equilibrium, there are exactly 2 active players.Sad-Loser Lottery 10
Proof. Suppose that there exists another internal equilibrium (x1,...,xn)d i ﬀerent
from (20). There are two cases.
Case 1. Suppose that player 1 is not active in this internal equilibrium. We show
that the non-entry condition (7) must be violated for player 1 in this case.
Note that if x1 = 0, then, from the non-entry condition (7), the total spending





Therefore, the non-entry condition (7) is violated for player 1.
Case 2. Suppose that x1 > 0. Then, there are at least k ≥ 3 active players in
this equilibrium. From (16), player 1 should spend
0 <x 1 = s(k) − V1 ≤ max
2≤k<n
s(k) − V1 < 0.
Therefore, there are exactly (n − 1) internal equilibria. ¥
Propositions 5 and 6 describe the highest and the lowest number of the internal
equilibria.
Corollary 1. There are at least (n − 1) and at most 2n −(n +1 )internal equilibria
in pure strategies.
There are two types of equilibria in the Sad-Loser lottery. The ﬁrst type, i-type
equilibria, with (very) high spending by just one player and zero spending from all
other players. Since the winner gets reimbursed, player i spends so much that it
pushes all other players to stay away from the Sad-Loser lottery, because they have
negative expected payoﬀsf o ra n ys p e n d i n gl e v e l .
The second type, internal equilibria, where there is a set of active players. Note
that all players can be active in an internal equilibrium. This class of equilibria is
very intuitive if players have “close” values for the lottery prize.
Example 1. Suppose that n =3a n dV1 ≥ V2 ≥ V3 > 0. Then, from Proposition
1, there are the following i-type equilibria in pure strategies:
• 1-type: (x1,0,0), where x1 ≥ V2;
• 2-type: (0,x 2,0), where x2 ≥ V1;
• 3-type: (0,0,x 3), where x3 ≥ V1.Sad-Loser Lottery 11
From Corollary 1, there are at least 2 internal equilibria in pure strategies:
• (V2,V 1,0);
• (V3,0,V 1).
If V1 ≤ V2+V3, then from Proposition 5 there are 2 other internal equilibria. One
with two active players:
• (0,V 3,V 2)




2 [V2 + V3 − V1], 1
2 [V1 + V3 − V2], 1
2 [V1 + V2 − V3]
¢
.
4.2. Weaker players win more often. Now, we show how players’ lottery prize
valuations aﬀect their spending in an internal equilibrium. Denote pil to be the
probability that player il wins the lottery.
Proposition 7. In each internal equilibrium with k active players,
xi1 ≤ ... ≤ xik
and
pi1 ≤ ... ≤ pik
if and only if
Vi1 ≥ ... ≥ Vik.
Proof. Consider any internal equilibrium with k active players. Suppose that
players i1 and i2 are active in this equilibrium and
Vi1 ≥ Vi2.
It follows from condition (16) that










Proposition 7 leads to the following surprising conclusion: A stronger player al-
ways has a lower chance to win the Sad-Loser lottery than a weaker player in any
internal equilibrium.Sad-Loser Lottery 12
Corollary 2. Suppose that Vi >V j. Consider an internal equilibrium where both
players i and j are active. Then pi <p j.
This observation together with the (non-)entry conditions establish the following
startling trade oﬀ: higher lottery prize value promises active participation in more
internal equilibria, but decreases winning chances. This trade oﬀ is unique in the
literature.12 So far, a monotonic relationship was ascertained: higher value would
lead to more frequent active equilibrium participation and more aggressive spending
which, as the result, would lead to higher winning chances. See, for example, Hillman
and Riley (1989); Nti (1999).
4.3. Total spending in internal equilibria. Consider an internal equilibrium








Therefore, the highest equilibrium spending with k a c t i v ep l a y e r si sa c h i e v e di ft h e









O u rn e x tr e s u l ts h o w st h a tt h eExclusion Principal holds for the total spending
in the Sad-Loser lottery.13 It is important to emphasize that the previous literature
indicates, see Fang (2002); Matros (2006), that the Exclusion Principle does not hold
in standard lotteries.
Proposition 8. Consider two internal equilibria with i1,...,ik and i1,...,ik,i k+1 ac-
tive players. Then,
s(i1,...,ik) ≥ s(i1,...,i k,i k+1).
Proof. Since player ik+1 is non-active in the internal equilibrium with i1,...,ik







12Cohen and Sela (2005) notice this eﬀect in the case of two players. They also point out (Propo-
sition 2) that “in the n player contest ... underdogs may win with the highest probability.” We prove
that this eﬀect holds in any internal equilibrium.
13For the Exclusion Principle see, for example, Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1993); Krishna
(2002).Sad-Loser Lottery 13
Note that
















Vij − (k − 1)Vik+1
!
≥ 0, (23)
where the last inequality follows from (22). ¥
Therefore, the highest total spending in an internal equilibrium is achieved if the





s(i1,i 2)=V1 + V2.
Hence, we prove the following result.
Proposition 9. The total spending in any internal equilibrium is at most V1 + V2.










Deﬁne the lowest equilibrium spending in any internal equilibrium as
















The following examples illustrate that the lowest equilibrium spending depends on
the lottery prize values.
Example 2. Suppose that
V1 = V2 = ... = Vn = V> 0.Sad-Loser Lottery 14
Then














Example 3. Suppose that

















= Vn +Vn−1 =m i n
i1,i2
s(2) = 1+2.
4.4. Expected net total spending. Consider the expected net total spending
in an internal equilibrium with i1,...,ik active players. Since the net total spending is
often the designer’s proﬁt, we will call the expected net total spending the expected




[s(k) − xi1]+... +
xik
s(k)



















The expected proﬁt in an internal equilibrium depends on the number of active
players and their lottery prize values. However, if all prize values are the same, the
proﬁti st h es a m ei na n yinternal equilibrium.
Proposition 10. Suppose that
V1 = V2 = ... = Vn = V .
Then, there are 2n−(n +1 )internal equilibria. In any internal equilibrium, the proﬁt
is equal to V .Sad-Loser Lottery 15
Proof. From Proposition 5, it follows that there are 2n − (n +1 )i n t e r n a le q u i -
















O u rn e x tr e s u l ts h o w sw h e nt h eExclusion Principal for the expected proﬁth o l d s
in the Sad-Loser lottery.
Proposition 11. Consider two internal equilibria with i1,...,ik and i1,...,ik,i k+1 ac-
tive players. Then,















Proof. See the Appendix.
The Exclusion Principal for the expected proﬁt does not hold for the highest-value
player.













The Exclusion Principal for the expected proﬁt holds for the lowest-value player.













Using the Exclusion Principal we can characterize the lowest and the highest
expected proﬁt in the Sad-Loser lottery now.
Proposition 12. The lowest expected proﬁt is achieved in the internal equilibrium
with the two lowest-value active players. This expected proﬁti s
2Vn−1Vn
Vn−1+Vn.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The following result can be proven similar to Proposition 12. We omit the proof.
Proposition 13. The highest expected proﬁt is achieved in the internal equilibrium
w i t ht h et w oh i g h e s t - v a l u ea c t i v ep l a y e r s .T h i se x p e c t e dp r o ﬁti s 2V1V2
V1+V2.
Propositions 12 and 13 describe the highest and the lowest boundaries on the
expected proﬁt in the Sad-Loser lottery.
Corollary 5. The expected proﬁti sa tl e a s t
2Vn−1Vn
Vn−1+Vn and at most 2V1V2
V1+V2 in an internal
equilibrium.
5. Standard vs Sad-Loser lottery
We compare a standard lottery (more common name is an asymmetric contest) with
a Sad-Loser lottery in this section. First, we describe the total equilibrium spending
in the standard lottery. Then, the total spending in the standard lottery is compared
with the (net) total spending in the Sad-Loser lottery. We will only look at internal
equilibria in the Sad-Loser lottery in this section.
5.1. Standard Lottery. Hillman and Riley (1989) identify the set of active play-
ers in the standard lottery (asymmetric rent-seeking contest) and the total equilibrium
spending. Stein (2002) follows Hillman and Riley (1989) and describes the players’
equilibrium strategies.
Consider a standard lottery among n risk-neutral players where (2) holds. Players
buy simultaneously lottery tickets in order to win one main prize. In particular, player
i spends bi ≥ 0 in order to win prize Vi. The players’ valuations are commonly known
among the players. Player i obtains the prize with probability
bi Pn
i=1 bi,i fbi > 0.





Vi − bi.Sad-Loser Lottery 17
Hillman and Riley (1989) demonstrate that the top 1,2,...,n players are active in

















Note that higher-value players spend more than lower-value players and have
higher chance to win the standard lottery. Moreover, each active player has a positive
expected proﬁt. We compare the standard and the Sad-Loser lotteries in the next
subsections.
5.2. Total spending. Since players can be reimbursed in the Sad-Loser lottery,
they buy more tickets in this lottery than they buy in the standard lottery. It turns
out that this observation hold in any internal equilibrium.
Proposition 14. Total spending in the Sad-Loser lottery is always higher than the




Proof. See the Appendix.
The lottery designer usually cares about her proﬁt. So, we compare the net total
spending (the expected proﬁt) in the Sad-Loser lottery with the total spending in the
standard lottery in the next subsection.
14Fang (2002) and Matros (2006) show that there exists a unique equilibrium in the standard
lottery.Sad-Loser Lottery 18
5.3. The expected proﬁt. As we show in Section 3, there are several internal
equilibria in the Sad-Loser lottery. In some of them, the expected proﬁti sh i g h e r
than the expected proﬁt in the standard lottery.
Proposition 15. The expected proﬁt in the internal equilibrium (V2,V 1,0,...,0) is
higher then the total spending in the standard lottery.
Proof. The expected proﬁt in the internal equilibrium (V2,V 1,0,...,0) is
2V1V2
V1+V2 ≥
V2. Player 2 is always active in the standard lottery and obtains positive payoﬀ.I t
means that T (n) <V 2. ¥
The following proposition provides the suﬃcient condition for the expected proﬁt
in any internal equilibrium to be higher than the total spending in the standard
lottery. It turns out that this condition is very natural: all players have to be active
in the standard lottery. This proposition suggests when the designer should run the
Sad-Loser lottery instead of the standard lottery.





Then, the expected proﬁt in any internal equilibrium in the Sad-Loser lottery is higher
than the total spending in the standard lottery.
Proof. Proposition 12 shows that the minimal expected proﬁti sa c h i e v e di nt h e
internal equilibrium with the two lowest-value active players (n − 1) and n.T h i s
expected proﬁti se q u a lt o
2Vn−1Vn
Vn−1+Vn ≥ Vn. The total spending in the standard lottery
with all n active players must be smaller than a prize value of any player, including
the lowest value player n. Therefore, the expected proﬁt in any internal equilibrium
is higher than the total spending in the standard lottery. ¥
There are several corollaries from Proposition 16. First, if there are just two
players.
Corollary 6. If n =2 , then the expected proﬁt in the internal equilibrium is higher
than the total spending in the standard lottery.
Proof. Condition (32) always holds for n =2 .¥
Seconds, if all lottery values are the same.Sad-Loser Lottery 19
Corollary 7. Suppose that
V1 = V2 = ... = Vn = V. (33)
Then, the expected proﬁt in any internal equilibrium is higher than the total spending
in the standard lottery.
Proof. Condition (32) always holds if condition (33) is satisﬁed.
We can see the same result in the following way. Proposition 10 shows that the
expected proﬁt in any internal equilibrium is V . Tullock (1980) demonstrates that
the total spending is equal to n−1
n V in the standard n-player lottery. ¥
The following example illustrates that Proposition 16 provides a suﬃcient condi-
tion. In this example, condition (32) does not hold, but the expected proﬁti sh i g h e r
in all internal equilibria than the total spending in the standard lottery.
Example 4. Suppose that n =3a n dV1 = V2 =1 0 ,V3 = 5. Then, the
total spending in the standard lottery (see Hillman and Riley, 1989; Stein, 2002) is
T (3) = 5. In Example 1, all internal equilibria in the 3-player Sad-Loser lottery are
calculated. See Table 2.
values eq’m (1,2) eq’m (1,3) eq’m (2,3) eq’m (1,2,3)
10 10 5 0 2.5
10 10 0 5 2.5
5 0 10 10 7.5
Expected proﬁt 10 6.67 6.67 7
Table 2: Sad-Loser Lottery
Tables 2 shows that the expected proﬁt in the Sad-Loser lottery (in all internal
equilibria) is higher than the total spending in the standard lottery.
If condition (32) does not hold, the expected proﬁtc a nb el o w e ri na l lb u to n e
internal equilibria. The following example illustrates.
Example 5. Suppose that n =3a n dV1 = V2 =1 0 ,V3 = 1. Then, the total
spending in the standard lottery is T (3) = 5. Based on Example 1, all internalSad-Loser Lottery 20
equilibria are calculated for the Sad-Loser lottery in Table 3.
values eq’m (1,2) eq’m (1,3) eq’m (2,3) eq’m (1,2,3)
10 10 1 0 0.5
10 10 0 1 0.5
1 0 10 10 9.5
Expected proﬁt 10 1.818 1.818 1.857
Table 3: Sad-Loser Lottery
The total spending in the standard lottery is higher than the expected proﬁti na l l
but one internal equilibrium in the Sad-Loser lottery.
5.4. Example. In this subsection, we consider an example which illustrates sev-
eral propositions above.
Example 6. Suppose that n =4a n dV1 =5 0>V 2 =4 5>V 3 =4 0>V 4 =3 5 .
Then, from Proposition 5, there are 11 internal equilibria in pure strategies:




















We can see that
• the expected proﬁt in any internal equilibrium is higher than the total spending
in the standard lottery (Proposition 16);Sad-Loser Lottery 21
• the total spending in the Sad-Loser lottery is always higher than the total
spending in the standard lottery (Proposition 14);
• the highest expected proﬁt is achieved in the internal equilibrium with the two
highest-value active players (Proposition 13);
• the lowest expected proﬁt is achieved in the internal equilibrium with the two
lowest-value active players (Proposition 12);
• the total spending in any internal equilibrium is at most V1 + V2 =9 5 ;
• Exclusion Principal holds for the (net) total spending in the Sad-Loser lottery
(Propositions 8 and 11).
6. Conclusion
This paper considers the Sad-Loser lottery. All equilibria in pure strategies are found
and their properties are discussed. There are several natural extensions of this paper.
It will be interesting to test the results in the experimental laboratory and in the
ﬁeld. We have already started an experimental investigation of the Sad-Loser lottery.
In particular, the equilibrium prediction (the counter-intuitive aggressive bidding of
weak players) and the Exclusion Principle will be tested.
Another direction is an application of the Sad-Loser lottery to the public good
provision. Since, as Morgan (2000) and Duncan (2002) show, lotteries increase pro-
vision of public goods, the Sad-Loser lottery might be even a better tool than the
standard lottery.
7. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 11. Consider an internal equilibrium (x1,...,xn)w i t hi1,...,ik
active players. Suppose that an active player ik+1 is added. Then, from (27),
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The statement of the proposition follows from the non-entry condition (7), expression
(15), and assumption (28). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 2 .Consider an internal equilibrium with i1,...,i k active
players where 2 ≤ k ≤ n and
Vi1 ≥ ... ≥ Vik.
There are four cases.
Case 1. Suppose that
Vi1 ≥ ... ≥ Vik >V n−1 ≥ Vn.Sad-Loser Lottery 23
Then, from Proposition 11,
π(n − 1,n) < π(ik,n− 1,n) < ... < π(i1,...,ik,n− 1,n) <
π(i1,...,ik,n− 1) < π(i1,...,ik).
Case 2. Suppose that
Vi1 ≥ ... ≥ Vik = Vn−1 ≥ Vn.
Then, from Proposition 11,
π(n − 1,n) < π(ik−1,i k,n) < ... < π(i1,...,ik,n) <
< π(i1,...,ik).
Case 3. Suppose that
Vi1 ≥ ... ≥ Vik−1 = Vn−1 ≥ Vik = Vn.
Then, from Proposition 11,
π(n − 1,n) < π(ik−2,i k−1,i k) < ... < π(i1,...,ik).
Case 4. Suppose that
Vi1 ≥ ... ≥ Vik−1 >V n−1 ≥ Vik = Vn.
First, we show that
π(n − 1,n) ≤ π(k,n), for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. (35)







⇐⇒ Vk ≥ Vn−1.
Therefore, from (35) and Proposition 11,
π(n − 1,n) < π(ik−1,n) < π(ik−2,i k−1,i k) <. . .<π(i1,...,ik).
Hence, the lowest expected proﬁt is reached in the equilibrium with the two lowest-










Proof of Proposition 14. It is a well known result, see for example Hillman
and Riley (1989), that the total spending in the standard lottery is strictly smaller
than the highest prize value,
T (n) <V 1. (36)

















The non-entry condition (7) must hold for player 1 in the internal equilibria with


















Consider the remaining case, mink≥2 s(k)=s(n)= 1
(n−1)
Pn
i=1 Vi. Then, from (16)
x1 = s(n) − V1 > 0.
Therefore,
s(n) >V 1 >T(n).
¥
References
[1] Baye, M., Kovenock, D. and De Vries, C.G. (1993): “Rigging the lobbying
process: An application of the all-pay auction.” American Economic Review
83, 289—294.
[2] Baye, M., Kovenock, D. and De Vries, C. (2005). Comparative Analysis of Litiga-
tion Systems: an Auction-Theoretic Approach. Economic Journal 115, 583—601.Sad-Loser Lottery 25
[3] Clotfelter C. and P. Cook (1989): Selling Hope: State Lotteries in America.
Harvard University Press.
[4] Clotfelter C. and P. Cook (1990): “On the Economics of State Lotteries,” Journal
of Economic Perspective 4, 105-119.
[5] Cohen, C., and Sela, A. (2005). Manipulations in contests. Economics Letters
86,1 3 5 - 1 3 9 .
[6] R. Congleton, A. Hillman and K. Konrad (2007). Forty Years of Research on
Rent Seeking: An overview, Mimeo.
[7] Cook P. and C. Clotfelter (1993): “The Peculiar Scale Economies of Lotto,”
American Economic Review 83, 634-643.
[ 8 ]L .C r a i g ,A .L a n g e ,J .L i s t ,M .P r i c e ,a n dN .R u p p( 2 0 0 6 ) : “ T o w a r da nU n -
derstanding of the Economics of Charity: Evidence from a Field Experiment,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(2), 747-782.
[9] Duncan B. (2002): “Pumpkin pies and public goods: The raﬄe fundraising
strategy,” Public Choice 111, 49-71.
[10] Fang, H. (2002): “Lottery versus all-pay auction models of lobbying,” Public
Choice 112,3 5 1 - 3 7 1 .
[11] Gradstein M., and K. Konrad (1999): “Orchestrating rent seeking contests,”
Economic Journal 109, 536-545.
[12] Hillman, A., and Riley, J. (1989). Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers.
Economics and Politics 1, 17—39.
[13] Kaplan, T., I. Luski, A. Sela, and D. Wettstein (2002). All-Pay Auctions with
Variable Rewards. Journal of Industrial Economics 4, 417-430.
[14] Konrad, K. (2007). Strategy in Contests - an Introduction, Mimeo,B e r l i n .
[15] Krishna, V. (2002). Auction theory. Academic Press.
[16] Lange, A., J. List, and M. Price (2007): “Using Lotteries to Finance Public
Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence,” International Economic Review
48, 901-927.
[17] Matros, A. (2006). Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations: Addition or dele-
tion of a player. Public Choice 129, 369-380.Sad-Loser Lottery 26
[18] Matros A. and D. Armanios (2007): “Tullock’s Contest with Reimbursements,”
Mimeo.
[19] Moldovanu, B., and A. Sela (2001): “The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Con-
tests,” American Economic Review 91, 542-58.
[20] Morgan J. (2000): “Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries,” Review of
Economic Studies 67, 761-784.
[21] Morgan J. and M. Sefton (2000): “Finding Public Goods with Lotteries: Exper-
imental Evidence,” Review of Economic Studies 67, 785-810.
[22] Nitzan, S. (1994). Modelling Rent-Seeking Contests. European Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 10(1), 41-60.
[23] Nti, K. (1999). Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations. Public Choice 98,4 1 5 —
430.
[24] Riley, J., and Samuelson, W. (1981). “Optimal Auctions.” American Economic
Review 71,3 8 1 - 3 9 2 .
[25] Stein, W. (2002). Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More than Two Contestants.
Public Choice, 113, 325-336.
[26] Szidarovszky, F., and Okuguchi K. (1997). On the Existence and Uniqueness of
Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games. Games and Economic Behavior
18,1 3 5 - 1 4 0 .
[27] Tullock, G. (1980). Eﬃcient rent-seeking. In J. M. Buchanan (Ed.), Toward a
theory of the rent-seeking society, (pp. 97-112). Texas A&M University Press,
College Station: Texas.